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A VERY SPECIAL REGULATORY MILESTONE 
William S. Laufer* 
ABSTRACT 
Expenditures underwriting corporate compliance in the United States 
are approaching a very special regulatory milestone.  Compliance costs are 
nearing municipal policing costs.  The trajectory of compliance expenditures 
over the past several decades may be traced to a good corporate citizenship 
movement in the mid-1990s where the government proposed a public-private 
sector partnership to combat corporate crime.  In this Essay, it is argued that 
this “partnership” was never really about a fair sharing the enforcement 
responsibilities.  The government hoped to overcome the near 
insurmountable challenge of getting evidence of corporate wrongdoing, 
while shifting as much of the burden and costs of policing to the regulated.  
Companies continue to justify making compliance expenditures in 
reasonably defensive ways to levels that are now unprecedented. 
The Essay highlights that those who rail against over-criminalization or 
corporate criminal liability, more generally, miss speaking out against a one-
sided regulatory strategy of compliance cost shifting that brings us to this 
historic milestone.  Moreover, the threat of unfair and burdensome costs was 
never with the very rare event of corporate criminal liability.  Rather, the 
threat came from firms taking the government’s bait that they needed to 
spend, and spend, and spend more.  This boundless spending, it is concluded, 
may be seen as imposition of a preemptive penalty on firms.  This is a way 
for regulators to ensure that firms pay a fair share for their wrongdoing for 
the “dark figure” of corporate culpability. 
In this Essay, some of the most significant questions about the private 
and public administration of justice are asked on the precipice of a gradual 
retreat from this very special regulatory milestone.  This retreat will come 
from efficiencies brought about by the digitalization of compliance and a 
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convergence in compliance technology, evaluation science, international 
standards, and investments in sophisticated enterprise-wide risk 
management systems.  The resulting reduction in compliance expenditures 
will bring about a corresponding decline in preemptive penalties.  The hope 
is that this will motivate government functionaries to join firms as an active 
partner in forging new and innovative paths to regulation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A regulatory milestone in the United States that seemed impossible to 
reach nearly a decade ago is now in sight.  There soon will be as many 
enterprise-wide risk, audit, legal, and compliance professionals on the 
payroll of corporations in the United States as municipal police officers 
keeping our streets safe.1  J.P. Morgan, for example, supports more 
compliance, risk, and fortress control professionals than all uniformed 
NYPD officers, and more than three times as many FBI special agents across 
 
 1.  This milestone is in reach if you add the U.S. Bureau of Labor estimate of 273,000 
compliance officers employed in 2016 (available at: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes13
1041.htm [https://perma.cc/CR8K-U97X]) with a modest percentage of the many other risk 
professionals across the FinTech and RegTech ecosystem.  See infra note 20. 
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all U.S. field offices.2  At the same time, corporate regulatory budgets, in 
total, appear to dwarf all local, state, and federal law enforcement 
expenditures.3  The regulatory spending at large banks represents up to 
twenty percent of their operating cost base, making some big city police 
department budgets look pale, if not anemic.4 
The primacy of “suite” over “street” hiring and spending should be a 
milestone of significant symbolic importance for neoconservatives and 
progressives alike.5  Those on the ideological right may justifiably ask 
whether the private allocation of regulatory and compliance expenditures is 
reasonable, sustainable, or a product of gross government overreach.  
Neoconservatives may increase their calls for the abolition of corporate 
criminal liability with a regulatory state that is already vastly “over-
criminalized.”  Progressives may wonder if corporate wrongdoing is finally 
being taken seriously, and why public policing expenditures so significantly 
 
 2.  See 2015 JP Morgan Annual Report 15 (2016) (“Since 2011, our total headcount 
directly associated with Controls has gone from 24,000 people to 43,000 people, and our total 
annual Controls spend has gone from $6 billion to approximately $9 billion annually over that 
same time period.  We have more work to do, but a strong and permanent foundation is in 
place.”); 2016 JP Morgan Annual Report 71-132 (2017) (discussing the significant expansion 
of fortress and compliance risk personnel over 2015); NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (2017) 
(“The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is the largest and one of the oldest 
municipal police departments in the United States, with approximately 36,000 officers.”) 
(http://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page 
[https://perma.cc/MN8X-MC4L]); FBI QUICK FACTS (2017) (the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation employs 13,598 special agents) (https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission 
[https://perma.cc/TZM2-3QGB]). 
 3.  See Curtis W. Copeland, Analysis of an Estimate of the Total Costs of Federal 
Regulations, Richard N. Marapao and Catherine G. Abulog (eds.) in FEDERAL REGULATORY 
COSTS: ESTIMATES AND ANALYSIS (discussing the costs of federal regulation of companies in 
terms of tax compliance, economic regulation, occupational safety, environmental protection, 
health, and homeland security). 
 4.  See, e.g., Matthias Memminger, Mike Baxter, and Edmund Lin, Banking Regtech to 
the Rescue: FINTECH SPECIALISTS CAN HELP IMPROVE COMPLIANCE, BUT BANKS SHOULD 
PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY 1 (2016) (“We estimate that governance, risk and compliance (GRC) 
costs account for 15% to 20% of the total ‘run the bank’ cost base of most major banks. And 
GRC demand drives roughly 40% of costs for ‘change the bank’ projects under way.”). 
 5.  Thinking about the investment made in corporate versus street crime control seems 
not only reasonably important, but long overdue. Asking how criminal justice expenditures 
are made, by whom, and how much, encourages fair suite-to-street comparisons.  See infra 
notes 99 to 104.  Of course, comparing private and public spending on compliance, and the 
same with street crime, is not any less important.  See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Aggregate 
Burden of Crime, 42 J. OF L. & ECON. 611 (1999) (analyzing a study considering the direct 
and indirect costs of crime on the entire nation, as well as the ancillary costs to the legal 
system and victims); David A. Anderson, The Cost of Crime, 7 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN 
MICROECONOMICS 209 (2011) (analyzing the economic costs of crime in terms of health, 
opportunity, and government expenditures).  A further defense of these comparisons appears 
infra notes 68 to 72. 
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target our inner-city streets. 
Politics aside, the escalation in regulatory expenditures and 
corresponding burden on corporate treasuries are fairly seen as the 
consequence of a long honeymoon with the good corporate citizenship 
movement.  This movement comes from a much-heralded partnership 
between government and the private sector to combat crime unveiled in the 
early to mid-1990s.6  In the wake of the passage of the Sentencing Guidelines 
for Organizations on November 1, 1991, “good corporate citizens” were 
tempted into a new and creative partnership with the government to prevent 
and ferret out corporate wrongdoing.  The government exchanged some 
measure of prosecutorial deference for the voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing, and a now familiar mix of cooperation, investigation, the 
expression of remorse, and diligent proactive and reactive efforts of firms.7 
In Part I of this Essay, it is argued that this “partnership” was never 
really about a fair sharing of the enforcement responsibilities and costs of 
corporate crime control.  It was not about putting in place measures and 
metrics known to promote ethics, integrity, and good governance.  There 
simply was no body of evidence-based research supporting formal 
prescriptions for compliance and good citizenship.  The government’s 
execution of this partnership was narrowly instrumental:  To overcome the 
near insurmountable challenge of gaining access to inculpatory evidence of 
corporate wrongdoing, while shifting as much of the burden and costs of 
policing to the regulated. 
The subsequent rise in private law enforcement spending came from a 
reaction to what may be best called “tease” and “threat” regulation, much of 
which was tied to crafted disclosures of evidence-empty diligence principles, 
followed by a somewhat regular pattern of episodic regulatory threats.8  
These save-face threats were punctuated by much-heralded changes in the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and federal agency policies, 
along with the promotion of being in compliance with The Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
 6.  William S. Laufer, Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate 
Citizenship, 34 AM. BUS. L. J. 157 (1996) (reviewing the history of the citizenship movement). 
 7.  William S. Laufer, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2008) (discussing the prescription of due diligence). 
 8.  See Sally S. Simpson, Cycles of Illegality: Antitrust Violations in Corporate 
America, 65 SOC. FORCES 943, 946 (1986) (suggesting meaningful patterns of antitrust 
behavior through 1927 to 1981); William S. Laufer and Alan Strudler, Corporate Crime and 
Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307 (2007) (“The cyclical history of corporate 
scandals, resulting in law reforms, active law enforcement, subsequent periods of regulatory 
laxity, and new scandals, invites the specter of over-criminalization.”); William S. Laufer, 
The Compliance Game, in REGULAÇÃO DO ABUSO NO ÂMBITO CORPORATIVO: O PAPEL DO 
DIREITO PENAL NA CRISE FINANCEIRA (Saad-Diniz, D. Brodowski & A. Luiza eds., 2015) 
(discussing episodic patterns). 
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Act of 2002 (“SOX”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).  Exaggerated fears of enforcement 
follow regulatory change and threats that prompt firms to generously, if not 
endlessly, spend in support of the status quo of a multi-stakeholder 
compliance game.  It comes as no surprise that this is a game filled with 
underexplored externalities. 
Part II asks questions about one such externality—the discordance 
between public representations about the priority attached to corporate crime 
prosecutions and actual public spending.  Here it is worth asking why public-
sector spending is so dedicated to street-level enforcement, while the hard 
and soft costs of self-regulation are increasingly, and now 
disproportionately, borne by businesses.  No matter what one thinks of the 
idea of corporate criminal liability, there is good reason to question the 
justification for this kind of self-funding in light of the perennial “street 
crime” targets of state and federal criminal justice expenditures.  At the same 
time, it is not naïve to pose the rhetorical question:  What does the overall 
prioritization of criminal justice expenditures reveal about which criminals 
and which criminal wrongs are worthy of the state’s attention and law 
enforcement investment?9 
Complicating any answer to this question is that the costs of self-
regulation will likely decrease in the intermediate term. Put aside any 
possible regulatory retrenchment or systematic deregulation spurred by the 
White House.10  The migration toward the digitalization of compliance, 
algorithm-based large data aggregation, increasingly sophisticated 
compliance data analytics and enterprise wide Governance, Risk, and 
Compliance (“GRC”) systems, will soon replace clunky and dated legacy 
systems and software.11  With a convergence in next generation machine 
 
 9.  Spending on policing our inner cities is both cathartic and instrumental in ways 
different from corporate criminal law enforcement.  A certain kind of moral indignation 
remains for street crimes and street criminals.  A palpable wrongness, absent with corporate 
offending, drives new place-based policing strategies, creative stop and frisk policies, 
frequent car stops, and a comfortable churning of street-level drug thugs.  See infra notes 94 
to 100. 
 10.  Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 FR 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).  Most recently, at the behest 
of the White House, Citigroup, Barclays, JP Morgan, UBS, and Deutsche Bank were granted 
long-term waivers for sanctions from the megabank global interest rate scandal, see 
Exemptions from Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions, 89 Fed. Reg. 61, 816 (Dec. 29, 
2017). 
 11.  For a consideration of the digitalization of compliance, see, e.g., Gregory Scopino, 
Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for Oversight of 
Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439 (2015) 
(describing the financial markets and how artificial intelligence will impact financial 
regulation); Robert R. Moeller, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ESTABLISHING 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE (GRC) PROCESSES (2011) (discussing the 
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learning technology, global compliance standards, and even rudimentary 
evaluation science, longstanding questions about how to monitor, surveil, 
and measure compliance effectiveness will be addressed in ways that also 
very efficiently reduce costs while enhancing transparency.12 
Thus, in Part III, it is concluded that some of the better answers to the 
most challenging questions raised in this Essay surrounding the 
private/public administration of justice are offered on the precipice of a 
retreat from this very special regulatory milestone.  This retreat will reaffirm 
what we have always thought about policing corporate malfeasance:  The 
priority given to elite organizational offending will always give way to the 
powerful press of society’s moral indignation, anger, and abject fear over 
street crime. 
 The Essay ends with three critical thoughts about reaching this very 
special regulatory milestone.  Each thought recognizes that firms today 
invest compliance expenditures to avoid criminal fines at levels that, at 
times, significantly exceed their exposure risk to sanctions.13  Each thought 
suggests that those who rail against over-criminalization missed speaking out 
against a one-sided regulatory strategy of compliance cost shifting that 
 
importance of enterprise risk management within the corporate structure, especially as it 
relates to compliance, risk portfolio, and corporate culture).  For a recent survey of how the 
compliance industry is welcoming Fintech and Regtech, see Stacey English & Susanna 
Hammond, Fintech, Regtech and the Role of Compliance 2017, Thomson Reuters (2016) 
(available at: https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/en/resources/special-report/fintech-regtech-
and-the-role-of-compliance-2017.html [https://perma.cc/W6TA-E8C6]).  
 12.  See Melanie Swan, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY (2015) 
(discussing the wide-ranging applicability of blockchain technology, including in government 
functions); Philip Treleaven and Bogdan Batrinca, Algorithmic Regulation: Automating 
Financial Compliance Monitoring and Regulation Using AI and Blockchain, 45 J. OF FIN. 
TRANSFORMATION 14 (2017) (discussing the effect artificial intelligence will have on 
corporate compliance work and the burdensome work of financial regulation); James Bone, 
The Emergence of a Cognitive Risk Era: Intentional Control Design and Machine Learning, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, July 17, 2017 (available at: 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/emergence-cognitive-risk-era-intentional-
control-design-machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/QFE7-UZHZ]) (analyzing the effect of 
automation, machine learning, and situational awareness on the corporate structure).   
 13.  Corporate criminal liability remains a rare event.  See Laufer, supra note 7 at 8 
(“Before and after the scandals, corporate prosecutions particularly of large, publicly traded 
entities remain an exception, rare in some jurisdictions and extraordinary in others. Actions 
against small, privately held companies predominate.  But the numbers of cases are still 
dreadfully small given even conservative estimates of the incidence of corporate crime.”).  
Survey research justifies compliance expenditures not from the risk of criminal sanctions 
resulting from criminal liability.  Rather, if compliance expenditures are justified, it is by the 
prospects of business disruption, reduced productivity, fees, and other non-legal costs.  See 
Ponemon Inst., THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE, 2 (2011) (available at: http://www.pone
mon.org/local/upload/file/True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report_copy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ULK-Y3KL]). 
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brings us to this historic milestone.  And, all three follow from the realization 
that the threat of unfair and burdensome costs was never with the very rare 
event of corporate criminal liability, the perennial target of the private 
sector’s ire.  The grave threat of unfair and burdensome regulatory costs 
came from firms taking the government’s bait that they needed to spend, and 
spend more.14  This boundless spending, it is concluded, may be seen as 
imposition of a preemptive penalty on firms.  It is a deft way for regulators 
to ensure that firms pay a fair share for their wrongdoing and, thus, capture 
the “dark figure” of corporate culpability.15 
In hindsight, the government conscription of private sector enforcers 
was a clever stratagem grounded in some very sound regulatory theory.  
Supporting the Sentencing Commission’s Good Citizenship campaign was 
the conventional scholarly wisdom that self-regulation without the 
availability of increasingly more formal enforcement mechanisms simply 
does not work.16  A true blend of formal government controls and private 
informal social controls is required.  An enforced self-regulation, in theory, 
requires the active engagement of the government to assure compliance, at 
the same time that firms internalize their fair share of enforcement duties and 
compliance costs.17  The motivation for contemporaneous public and private 
 
 14.  See U.S. Government Accountability Office, REGULATORY BURDEN: MEASUREMENT 
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS RAISED BY SELECTED COMPANIES (2013) (describing GAO’s 
report on the cumulative effect of federal regulations on certain businesses by analyzing costs 
and impacts and problematic regulations.); Stacey English and Susanna Hammond, COSTS OF 
COMPLIANCE 2016, Thomson Reuters (2016) (available at: https://risk.thomsonreut
ers.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/report/cost-compliance-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CZA9-QX53]) (sharing the results of Reuters’ annual survey analyzing the 
impact of regulatory change, personal liability, and outsourcing for firms). 
 15.  This may not qualify as a Pigouvian tax in the absence of good measurement or 
accurate assessment of negative externalities.  It does, though, bear some likeness.  See Dennis 
W. Carlton and Glenn C. Loury, The Limitation of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy 
for Externalities, 95 Q. J. ECON. 559 (1980) (discussing the theory that Pigouvian taxes alone 
cannot control externalities); and Dennis W. Carlton and Glenn C. Loury, The Limitation of 
Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities: An Extension of Results, 101 Q. J. 
ECON. 631 (1986) (building on their previous publication by analyzing the efficiency of 
constant per unit emission taxes); Arthur Pigou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 256 (1924) 
(discussing the principal influences by which the average volume of the national dividend is 
affected); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990) (offering a preference shaping 
perspective grounded in optimal penalty theory). 
 16.  For a review of the Sentencing Commission’s construction of good citizenship, 
consider the musings of the two architects of Chapter 8 of the Guidelines (Organizational 
Guidelines), Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About 
their Future, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 205 (1993) (analyzing the impact of the Sentencing Reform 
Act and the U.S. Sentencing Commission on corporations). 
 17.  John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime 
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law enforcement was not hidden from leading regulatory theorists: Enforced 
self-regulation was essential because government “. . .simply cannot afford 
to do an adequate job on its own.”18 
Unfortunately, that part of the script of enforced self-regulation 
requiring active public-sector investment in developing regulatory capacity 
and deploying a range of graduated formal and informal controls was not 
followed.19  Instead, successful conscription of private sector “self-
regulators” shielded the federal government from sharing partnership costs.  
At the same time, the government promoted active, if not boundless private 
sector investment in compliance programming, training, and technology.  
The idea of a good corporate citizen brought about an increasingly large 
compliance “machine” doing the lion’s share of what was, at least 
theoretically, the province of both government and private firm enforcement 
efforts.20 
A little more than two decades after the birth of this corporate crime 
control partnership, who would have guessed that private sector regulatory 
costs would rival the budgets of municipal police departments?21  The 
 
Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982) (discussing the prevalence of corporate crime and how 
it would be more effective to have self-regulation than to rely on government investigators). 
 18.  Id. at 1467. 
 19.  The importance of regulators in the mix of a private ordering or self-regulatory 
regime is critical to the efficient building of private sector capacity.  See, e.g., Jodi L. Short 
and Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical 
Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 386 (2010) (“. . . [H]igh levels of 
regulatory surveillance at both the field and organizational levels promote the implementation 
of self-regulation.”) 
 20.  This is not to say that regulators fail to contribute at all to this partnership.  It is, 
rather, that the private sector does so overwhelmingly.  Compare the resources devoted to 
compliance data analytics at the SEC versus a single large bank, for example, and the point is 
made.  
 21. This milestone considers the total cost of compliance, including consulting, software, 
staff and training, IT Services, auditing, legal and governance, insurance, and records 
management across all of the following risk management categories: enterprise-wide risk, 
capital risk, credit risk, country risk, liquidity risk, market risk, principal risk, compliance risk, 
conduct risk, legal risk, model risk, operational risk, and reputation risk.  Personnel estimates 
come from publicly available corporate annual reports, where large financial institutions each 
staff between 20,000 and 45,000 compliance and fortress professionals, and data from the 
U.S. Department of Labor which reveal the following estimates: financial examiners (49,750); 
compliance officers (273,910); credit analysts (72,930), and management analysts (637,690).  
Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2016, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 31, 
2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3S3-GUMU]; 
cf. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982-2007-
STATISTICAL TABLES (2011) (breaking down the various expenses and growing trends of the 
costs of public justice expenditures).  This combined pool along with a small percentage of 
legal staff, audit professionals, and examiners, both in-house and contracted personnel from 
accountancies, management consultancies, and law firms bring us close to the number of 
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language of integrity, good citizenship, and shared responsibility in the 
1990s offered no clue as to how costly it would be for firms over time, how 
alone companies would be in making this investment in private ordering, and 
how little would be learned about how compliance expenditures actually 
affect the behavior of agents throughout the corporate hierarchy.22 
I. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE POLICING EXPENDITURES 
It was a solemn occasion that celebrated the perfect alignment of the 
public sector’s desire for justice and the private sector’s willingness to join 
in on a mission for responsible corporate citizenship.  The nearly 500 
attendees of the United States Sentencing Commission’s (“Sentencing 
Commission”) conference on Corporate Crime in America: Strengthening 
the “Good Citizen” Corporation on September 7, 1995 would hear something 
so very comforting:  Those in the business community now have a trusted 
partner in self-policing.23  The charge by Judge Richard P. Conaboy, 
Chairman of the Sentencing Commission, was normative and inspirational: 
You must take on the obligation to lead this effort, to be in the 
 
sworn police officers in the U.S. (750,000).  Reaching this milestone assumes a continued 
modest rise in compliance hiring. Consider that LinkedIn now averages approximately 
706,000 listings of compliance positions. LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/compliance-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/2VNZ-WK3Y] (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2017).  Notably, this critique of compliance spending and staff does extend 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but with some notable qualifications.  The 
SEC does commit a sizable percentage of their budget to ensuring regulatory compliance and 
invests an increasing amount to support compliance data analytics among other important IT 
initiatives, such as redesigning the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval 
(EDGAR), improving examinations through risk assessment and surveillance tools, 
enhancing the Tips, Complaints, and Referral system (TCR), and improving enforcement 
investigation and litigation tracking. Unfortunately, their budget is woefully inadequate, at 
least compared to the private sector they oversee, and supports slightly more than 1,300 
enforcement staff and 1,000 compliance personnel.  See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (2016) at *14, https://www.sec.gov/abou
t/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXQ6-7KSS] (listing the various SEC 
employment numbers). 
 22.  For a glimpse of how little is known about effective strategies for corporate crime 
control, see Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie, & Mariel Alper, What 
Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y. 387, 410 (2016) (asserting that more studies are needed to determine how to effectively 
deter corporate crime). 
 23.  Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Crime and Punishment in the United 
States, on Corporate Crime in America: Strengthening the “Good Citizen” Corporation (Sept. 
7-8, 1995), (found at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publicatio
ns/research-projects-and-surveys/economic-crimes/19950907-
symposium/WCSYMPO_opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A2M-7GBS]). 
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forefront, not only by working to ensure that your companies’ 
employees follow the law but by embracing and placing at the very 
top of your companies’ priorities the basic good citizenship values 
that make law abidance possible.24 
In exchange, the government offered the business community some 
basic due diligence principles that would serve firms well in attempting to 
mitigate any possible investigation and adjudication of wrongdoing.25  No 
one ever imagined such a large and sweet carrot:  Compliance expenditures 
would be considered in the discretionary calculus of prosecutors to proceed 
criminally against a corporation.  For more than a decade following their 
passage, being “in compliance” with the Commission’s Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations was code for adhering to the text and subtext 
of a well-settled prescription for good corporate citizenship.26  It is not an 
overstatement that this government-sponsored conference several decades 
ago marked the beginning of a new partnership between business and 
government—or so it seemed. 
A. Disingenuous Partners in Crime Control 
Architects of enforced self-regulation envisioned a regulatory world 
that recognized the superiority of firms to self-police under the watchful eyes 
 
 24.  Id. at 8, 10. 
 25.  See id. at 41 (offering standards to serve as a starting point for companies seeking to 
develop corporate crime control policies). 
 26.  The history of this partnership predates the Sentencing Commission’s work on 
organizational offenses.  Consider that in 1986 the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management (the Packard Commission), organized behind the Defense Industry Initiative 
(DII), called for a renewed corporate self-governance, commitment to industry-specific codes 
of conduct, and development of internal controls so as to ensure public confidence in the 
defense industry.  The DII sought to increase the awareness of and commitment to business 
ethics, including the adoption of codes of ethics and conduct, ethics orientation and training, 
a mechanism (such as a hotline) to surface concerns about corporate compliance, and 
procedures for voluntary disclosure of violations of federal laws.  Thus, the Sentencing 
Commission inherited a prescription for corporate self-governance, the creation of codes, 
internal disciplinary mechanisms, and internal controls that surely influenced their work on 
the development of Chapter Eight principles.  See Laufer, supra note 6, at 161 (explaining 
that the kind of organizational due diligence outlined in the Sentencing Guidelines has a 
foundation in agency theory and corporate governance laws); see also Amitai Etzioni, The 
U.S. Sentencing Commission on Corporate Crime: A Critique, 525 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 147, 
149-50 (1993) (asserting that the failure of the Sentencing Commission to consider political 
forces threatened to undermine its recommendations).  For a review of the progress of post 
guidelines cases, see Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A. Cohen, Regulating 
Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 
J.L. & ECON. 393 (1999). 
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of the government.27  The design included an active monitoring role for 
government, agreeing to specific firm conduct rules, and responding with 
causes of action for non-compliance in increasingly formal and punitive 
ways.28  In hindsight, though, it is clear that this was never a true partnership.  
Success hinged on a significant government investment in regulatory 
capacity to keep pace with private sector spending on the management of a 
wide range of legal, regulatory, governance, and compliance risks.29  A 
reasonably proportionate public investment in enterprise risk management 
systems or compliance data analytics was simply not made.  And leadership 
pushing evidence-based research rather than evidence-empty prescriptions 
for good corporate citizenship was nowhere to be found.30 
What does it mean that the private sector effort to coordinate and 
oversee self-policing was not met with a comparable public sector 
engagement?  Public sector strategy was then, as it is now, all about shifting 
the costs of corporate criminal law enforcement to the deepest private pocket 
while, at the same time, prying open a window into the corporate form for 
inculpatory evidence.  There, when and where non-compliance surfaced, the 
private “partner” in crime control would be incentivized to spend more 
compliance dollars.  Government functionaries, without an obligation to 
define what it means to have an effective compliance program, could simply 
moderate the need for additional compliance expenditures — a key proxy for 
organizational due diligence.31  With this kind of strategic cost shifting, it is 
 
 27.  See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (offering the definitive statement on the 
theory of responsive regulation).  
 28.  See, e.g., Robyn Fairman & Charlotte Yapp, Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, 
and Conception of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement, 27 L. & 
POL’Y 491, 497 (2005) (arguing that punishments should first be informal and gradually 
advance to more formal levels if the company remains non-compliant); Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement, 3 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 376, 381 (2009) (suggesting that the regulator’s use of formal, coercive 
enforcement methods should correlate with the alleged offender’s willingness to cooperate). 
 29.  See generally William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox 
of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (1999) (discussing how regulation was orchestrated 
to shift the costs and risks of entity liability). 
 30.  For a comparison between estimated private and public compliance staffing costs, 
see SOCIETY FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, STAFFING AND BUDGET 
BENCHMARKING GUIDANCE SURVEY (2016), (available at: http://www.corporatecomplian
ce.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/Surveys/scce-2016-benchmarking-guidance-survey-
report.pdf?ver=2016-06-15-075138863 [https://perma.cc/4HXG-LWFM]). 
 31.  See United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 23, at 120 (suggesting that 
government officials have a duty to coordinate their enforcement measures); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Criminal Div. Fraud Section, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (2017) 
(stating after more than twenty-five years, criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of compliance 
program were recently made public). 
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little wonder that private expenditures now approach, if not eclipse, public 
funding of street crime enforcement.32 
Judge A. David Mazzone introduced the keynote speaker at this 
Commission conference, Senator Edward Kennedy, with more than a hint of 
transparency.  “Today, when government talks about downsizing, budget 
complaints, and withdrawing, it’s even more important to understand and to 
promote the role that the ‘good citizen’ corporation will play in the United 
States.”33  His words now seem all too self-serving:  Good corporate citizens 
will achieve compliance—become compliant—by spending on compliance 
in ways that provide a certain kind of relief for the government. 
To Kennedy’s great credit, his lunch-time address expressed concerns 
with the authenticity of the private sector’s commitment to compliance.  
Kennedy opined: 
In a very real sense, the success of the new policy rests with 
you . . . and with many like you across the country.  Members of 
the business community and those who counsel corporate clients 
must recognize that there will always be skepticism about a policy 
that gives any break to corporations that have committed crimes, 
as the guidelines will sometimes do when a corporation 
demonstrates a solid compliance program.  That skepticism will 
grow if the public comes to believe that companies are 
approaching the guidelines with a ‘window dressing’ compliance 
effort and a clever law firm waiting in the wings at the first sign of 
trouble.34 
Kennedy called on businesses to embrace compliance in genuine and 
authentic ways.  But, alas, very little came from this aspirational embrace.  
This was a shallow grasp not only because some firms, it soon became 
apparent, beautifully dressed and adorned their windows.  It was shallow, in 
large part, because prosecutors and regulators simply failed to deliver in their 
more substantive partnership responsibilities.35  The long iteration of federal 
 
 32.  There is an active academic discussion about whether there are enough resources 
allocated to police inner cities.  See generally Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Are U.S. 
Cities Underpoliced?: Theory and Evidence (Univ. of Pa. Dep’t of Criminology, Working 
Paper No. 2016-7.0, 2015) (suggesting that U.S. cities are under-policed).  The argument 
advanced in this Essay does not turn on whether we are moving in the direction of an optimal 
allocation of criminal justice expenditures. Rather, the concern here is with the responsibility 
of the State in corporate crime spending. 
 33.  United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 23, at 115. 
 34.  Id. at 119-20. 
 35.  The betrayal of partnership responsibilities came about from a failure by the state to 
initiate and maintain an investment in compliance capacity, a failure that continues to this 
day.  This responsibility to lead the regulated is not fully captured by aggregated regulatory 
cost data.  For a discussion of the disaggregation of regulatory and compliance costs, with 
LAUFER_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:15 PM 
404 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.2 
 
prosecutorial guidelines, from Holder, McNulty, and Thompson to Filip 
were no substitutes for building regulatory capacity.36  These prescriptions 
for prosecutors did little to guide a business community desperate for 
something more than a due diligence or good governance prophylaxis.  All 
that the white collar bar received was a slightly revised set of guidelines lifted 
from Chapter 8 of the United States Sentencing Commission.  It was, alas, 
an invitation for a new line of revenue and, for firms, another long invoice. 
Not much more need be said of the heralded Yates Memoranda from 
DOJ prescribing individual liability before any prosecutorial resort to 
corporate liability.37  Yates pushed the prosecutorial pendulum back to where 
it once was, but to what end?  Were there too many corporate prosecutions?38  
Too few individual prosecutions?39  Were firms not taking the prescriptions 
 
some comparative data (U.K. and U.S.).  See Julian R. Franks, Stephen M. Schaefer, & 
Michael D. Staunton, The Direct and Compliance Costs of Financial Regulation, 21 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1547 (1997).  For a U.S.-centered analysis of regulatory costs with a separate 
analysis by firm size and sector, see Copeland, supra note 3; see also Robert W. Hahn & John 
A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 
259 (1991) (providing a comprehensive study and analysis concluding that the benefits of 
social regulation outweigh the costs by only a small margin). 
 36.  See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (June 16, 1999) (providing guidance to prosecutors about the factors 
to consider before charging a company); Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, on Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) (providing a revised set of 
principles to guide prosecutors deciding whether to charge a company of wrongdoing); 
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of 
Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Dec. 16, 2006) (revising and superseding the guidance issued by Deputy 
Attorney General Larry Thompson); Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), (available at http://www.jus
tice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3YK-52XB]) (revis-
ing further the guidance set forth by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty). 
 37.  See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, on Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download 
[https://perma.cc/FEG2-PCQC] (establishing principles for the Department of Justice based 
on the premise that individual accountability is an effective method to combat corporate 
misconduct). 
 38.  See TracReports, Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal 
Prosecutions of Corporations (Oct. 13, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ 
[https://perma.cc/63KH-DY5G] (“Despite repeated claims to the contrary by top officials at 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the government’s criminal prosecution of corporate violators 
has declined substantially in the last decade, falling by almost one third (29%) between FY 
2004 and FY 2014.”). 
 39.  See TracReports, White Collar Crime Convictions Continue to Decline (Apr. 7, 
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seriously? Without any investment in building regulatory capacity, Yates 
simply ushered in more firm spending on the pretext that individualized 
prosecutions were now the preferred path for “doing justice.”  Finally, in 
such sharp contrast to the extraordinary burden placed on corporations, there 
was barely a hint of sharing and partnering costs in the compliance scripts of 
SOX and Dodd-Frank.40  The same may be said of the DOJ’s most recent 
guidance on the evaluation of corporate compliance programs.  Like all of 
the other nods and winks about what really matters to prosecutors, this is 
nothing more than an additional round in a pretend game of evaluation 
science with an ultracrepidarian’s hand.41 
Regulators tease the regulated with rudimentary prescriptions for 
diligence that appear to be literally ripped from the pages of introductory 
management textbooks and business airport books.42  Focus on corporate 
 
2016), (“Federal white collar prosecutions reached a 20-year historic low last year, and there 
is still an ongoing slide in both prosecutions and convictions.”) (available at: 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/421/ [https://perma.cc/JMK7-L3MM]).  
 40.  Consider, though, the enormous private sector burden.  See e.g., Daniel M. 
Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 2013 National Compliance 
Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers (Apr. 9, 2013) (transcript available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch040913dmghtm [https://perma.cc/ZS35-DP3Q
]) (“New rules proposed or implemented by the SEC, CFTC, and other agencies pursuant to 
the Dodd-Frank Act have already tremendously increased burdens on compliance 
departments throughout the securities industry.  For example, last year, the House Financial 
Services Committee estimated that it will take 24 million man hours every year in order for 
the private sector to comply with Dodd-Frank rules.”); see also Michael D. Greenberg, For 
Whom the Whistle Blows: Advancing Corporate Compliance and Integrity Efforts in the Era 
of Dodd-Frank at 3-4 (2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF290.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WJX-HLBK] (explaining that the purpose of a RAND symposium was to 
consider the value of internal reporting programs).  
 41.  See U.S. Department of Justice  Criminal Division, Fraud Section Evaluation of 
Corporate Compliance Program, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/
download [https://perma.cc/QJH4-CC4B] (providing a framework for evaluating corporate 
compliance programs); Ronald H. Levine & Carolyn H. Kendall, The DOJ’s New Parameters 
for Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs, LAW JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS, July 2017 
(explaining that the parameters of the compliance program evaluation memorandum are 
extensive in scope, containing over one hundred questions for the DOJ to ask); U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 31 (providing a framework for evaluating corporate compliance 
programs).  For an excellent review of the challenges of evaluating compliance, see generally 
Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen, The Challenge of Empirical Research on Business 
Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45 (2009). 
 42. For an excellent review of the challenges of compliance measurement, see CHRISTINE 
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002) 
(laying out an innovative framework for successfully building management systems for self-
regulation); see also Christine Parker and Vibeke L. Nielsen, Corporate Compliance Systems: 
Could They Make Any Difference?, 41 ADMIN. & SOC. 3, 3 (2008) (demonstrating, through 
survey data, that commitment to compliance is more important than the compliance system 
itself). 
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culture and the tone at the top.  Ensure that corporate leadership drives 
organizational integrity.  Be proactive and appropriately reactive about 
ethics.  Give whistleblowers a means of communication.  Hire ethics officers 
with direct report to senior management and the board of directors.  And 
when there are compliance failures, enforce internal violations of codes of 
ethics with appropriate disciplinary mechanisms. 
When firms made a reasonable investment in new compliance systems, 
technology, and training, and there were failures, corporate fraud cases were 
disposed of with increasingly large criminal fines and, by prescription, 
commitments for additional compliance hiring and expenditures.43  The 
regulatory recipe could not be wrong, even in the absence of any empirical 
evidence.  More and then more of the same compliance ingredients are 
required.  Over the past several years, and after decades of cooking with the 
same regulatory recipe, the compliance budgets of the largest companies for 
individual legal risk areas, such as anti-money laundering, are well in the 
billions.  When all risk areas are aggregated, the regulatory spend for large 
financial institutions, for example, is nothing short of astronomical.44 
It is regrettable that public partners in corporate crime control who 
asked for all of this spending are not systematically examining the integrity 
 
 43.  See Laufer, supra note 29 (discussing the critical role of compliance expenditures). 
See also Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2075, 2134 (2016) (advocating for decreased government involvement in compliance, 
and increased disclosures). 
 44.  See U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 14; English and Hammond, 
supra note 14 (describing increased regulatory spending); see also Gregory Elliehausen, The 
Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 252, 252 (1998) 
(finding that the cost of all bank regulations amounted to roughly 12% of non-interest 
expenses for banks in 1991); James A. Millar and B. Wade Bowen, Small and Large Firm 
Regulatory Costs: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 161, 166 
(2011) (sharing the results of an empirical test which showed that audit fees were statistically-
significantly higher after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley); Franks, supra note 35, at 1549 
(referencing multiple studies which show that the cost of regulations are roughly ten-billion 
dollars per year in the U.S. banking industry).  But cf. Winston Harrington, Richard D. 
Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 JOURNAL 
OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 297, 300 (2000) (noting that aggregating areas of 
regulatory spending can lead to overestimations of regulatory cost).  For a right critique of 
regulatory costs, see James L. Gattuso & Diane Katz, Regulation: Killing Opportunity, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (October 21, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/government-
regulation/report/regulation-killing-opportunity [https://perma.cc/Q2DV-UE94] (discussing 
how the exponential increase in the number of regulations has been accompanied by a large 
increase in regulatory costs); see also William S. Laufer, Compliance and Evidence: Glimpses 
of Optimism from a Perennial Pessimist, in DIE VERFASSUNG MODERNER STRAFREC
HTSPFLEGE: ERINNERUNG AN JOACHIM VOGEL 423, 425-26 (K. Tiedemann, U. Sieber, H. 
Satzger, C. Burchard, & D. Brodowski eds., 2016) (reasoning that advances in compliance 
measurement and global enterprise-wide compliance standards could alter compliance 
practices). 
LAUFER_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  3:15 PM 
2017] A VERY SPECIAL REGULATORY MILESTONE 407 
 
of integrity programs or the effectiveness of “effective” compliance 
programs with evidence-based measures.45  Public partners are all but mute 
on the need for literally tens of thousands of compliance, risk, and audit 
professionals on the payroll of a single bank.  And who really knows what 
kind of changes in employee behavior, if any, are actually brought about by 
our wholesale investment in ethics, integrity, and compliance training.  
Public partners promoting private compliance expenditures are not spending 
enough on leading edge compliance data analytics or coming close to 
leveraging the promise of large data.46  Public partners are not investing 
billions of dollars to migrate from their entrenched legacy systems to the 
latest monitoring and surveillance technologies.  Partners who demand 
unbridled compliance expenditures from firms show little to no interest in 
adopting the kind of real-time co-regulatory and plural regulatory systems 
with the private sector — or regulators in other sovereignties — that are 
simply around the bend.  Technology, along with decentered and plural 
conceptions of regulation, holds great promise for a new generation of real 
partners committed to corporate crime control.47  Sadly, only one partner is 
seriously thinking about and aggressively spending on its regulatory future.48 
This is regrettable for many reasons including the fact that, as with 
underwriting the costs of law enforcement with street crime, being an active 
regulatory partner here is an integral part of the government’s 
 
 45.  One “expert” was simply not enough capacity to evaluate and promulgate evidence-
based metrics for regulatory capacity.  Cf. Department of Justice, New Compliance Counsel 
Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section, September 3, 2015 (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download [https://perma.cc/3SJL-
TMXT]) (showing the need to hire an additional expert); Sue Reisinger, Hui Chen’s Last Day 
as Compliance Counsel to DOJ, Inside Counsel, June 26, 2017 (available at: 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/217/06/26/hui-chens-last-day-as-compliance-counsel-to-doj 
[https://perma.cc/9W69-AWRG]) (noting that Chen has trained many attorneys in the DOJ 
and that it will still be necessary to replace her). 
 46.  There are, admittedly, a handful of agencies determined to capture rampant fraud 
and abuse with compliance data analytics, from the Department of Health and Human 
Services to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  See, e.g., Data Analytics to Address 
Fraud and Improper Payments (2017), (available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/68
3859.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG5F-LDC2]) (summarizing a forum, convened by the 
Comptroller General of the U.S., dedicated to the use of data analytics to address fraudulent 
payments).  These efforts, however, are so significantly eclipsed by private sector spending.  
See Short and Toffel, supra note 19 (discussing private sector investment and the absence of 
public sector enforcement). 
 47.  See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a 
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 672 (2010) (exploring some of the challenges associated 
with technology in compliance). 
 48.  See Ann Dryden Witte & Robert Witt, What We Spend and What We Get: Public 
and Private Provision of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 22 FISCAL STUD. 2 (2001) 
(discussing worldwide spending on police and crime prevention more generally). 
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responsibility.49  Conventional theories of economic regulation turn, at least 
in part, on the fact that “. . . regulation is instituted primarily for the 
protection and benefit of the public at large. . . .”50  Leaving an unreasonable 
share of this task to the private sector fails to fully recognize, embrace, and 
discharge this dual responsibility.51  Moreover, any sense of responsibility is 
made that much more important by the fact that firms were explicitly offered 
an active partner in crime control.52 
B. “Tease” and “Threat” Regulation 
It is perhaps unfair to speak of a betrayal of the public partner to 
corporate crime control without also questioning the motives, interests, and 
actions of its private partners — and any regulatory arbitrage.53  Admittedly, 
corporations and other parties are complicit in keeping this partnership as it 
is.  Elsewhere, I speak of the public-private sector compliance relationship 
as a multi-stakeholder game.54  Here stakeholders seek to protect and 
enhance their positions while minimizing any compromise of the regulatory 
 
 49.  This responsibility is not discharged by the overall demands on agencies that come 
from complex reform legislation, including rulemakings and implementation costs.  The same 
can be said of cooperation policies that incentivize corporate disclosures.  See, e.g., SEC 
Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 202.12 (2000) (announcing an analytical 
framework to be used when evaluating the cooperation of individuals).  For a critical 
commentary on the trading of cooperation for due diligence credit, see William S. Laufer, 
Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643 (2002) 
(questioning the fairness of trading cooperation for government favors, amidst an otherwise 
positive partnership between corporation and government). 
 50.  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 21 THE BELL J. OF ECON. AND 
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). 
 51.  What does it say when shareholders assume the costs of corporate compliance and 
taxpayers fund the policing of street crime?  See Dryden, supra note 48 (considering the 
relative role of public and private sectors in crime control and criminal justice); see also Mark 
A. Cohen, Roland T. Rust, & Sara Steen, Prevention, Crime Control or Cash? Public 
Preferences Towards Criminal Justice Spending Priorities (Richard H. Smith Sch. of Bus. 
Working Paper No. RHS-06-048, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=762626 [https://perma.cc/VDM4-RP95] (exploring the public’s priorities on 
spending). 
 52.  See United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 23, at 359 (“The new policy 
is fair and provides opportunities for the agency and the regulated community to work together 
to ensure compliance.  This is a partnership that can only thrive when communication is open 
and frank.”). 
 53.  See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (“. . .the 
most effective techniques [of regulatory arbitrage] are more pernicious, crafted by lawyers to 
meet the letter of the law while undermining its spirit, successful only until the government 
discovers and closes the loophole.”). 
 54.  See Laufer, supra note 49 (discussing the bargained for trades in the public-private 
regulatory partnership). 
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equilibrium.  This is more of a match of posturing and appearances with rules 
that spare the largest firms from prosecution due to the possibility of 
systemic risk.  This is a game where large firms whose prosecution does not 
pose a system risk receive crafted plea agreements.  Rarely and episodically, 
symbolic prosecutions of high profile defendants are sought to assuage 
concerns over market fairness. And small firms, those with far less access to 
compliance counsel, are more likely to be prosecuted to conviction.55 
This is a game that seeks optimal compliance expenditures to minimize 
liability risks while giving players needed moral cover and an appearance of 
legitimacy.56  In this game it is practically impossible for regulators and 
prosecutors to make meaningful distinctions between and among ethical 
leaders and laggards, between compliant and non-compliant firms.  In fact, 
one of many remarkable results of this game is the maintenance of an active 
market for commodified compliance products, programs, and solutions.  The 
ultimate objective of this game and associated commodities, however, is not 
corporate crime control.  Compliance expenditures are not made with 
evidence that they will promote employee integrity, change corporate 
behavior, improve corporate culture, and facilitate ethical corporate decision 
making.57  Companies buy assurance that if and when there is wrongdoing, 
the entity will be spared.58 
The public objectives of compliance expenditures are confounded by 
concerns of firms that a more careful, technology-driven and, indeed, 
scientific consideration of compliance would result in expectations of 
voluntary disclosures to regulators and prosecutors.  This is a true 
compliance conundrum.59  If one looks at the history of this game in light of 
 
 55.  See Brandon L. Garrett, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS (2014) (providing a seminal treatment of firm size and corporate criminal 
justice); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 
(2007) (giving an insightful review of post-sentencing reforms); Laufer, supra note 7 
(discussing the game and its players). 
 56.  See Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, Procedural Justice and Regulatory 
Compliance, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 95 (1996) (“Perceptions of the fairness of processes 
are more strongly associated with satisfaction with the regulatory process than are the 
favorableness of regulatory outcomes.”). 
 57.  See David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance 
and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 317 (2016) (discussing the challenges of evidence-based research). 
 58.  See William S. Laufer, Illusions of Compliance and Governance, 6 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 239 (2006) (reviewing firm culpability in relation to the compliance industry). 
 59.  See William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal 
Law, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. (2017) (discussing the compliance conundrum); see also Susan 
Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 169 (2015) (detailing the rise of the role of Chief 
Compliance Officer and the interplay between compliance mandates and failing to comply).  
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this conundrum, it is simply a catalog of public stakeholders teasing firms 
with prescriptive guidelines and then threatening firms in ways that push 
compliance spending forward with both partners lacking an incentive to 
assess, evaluate, and actually share compliance data.60  Ultimately, this 
compliance conundrum redounds to public partners who minimize their own 
costs by not having to look inside the regulatory kitchen, along with a 
gleefully complicit compliance and ethics industry who take their fair share 
of the “good citizenship” spending.  Knowing the players and rules of this 
game opens a window into how corporate crime control “partners” maintain 
an equilibrium, but one that is uncertain in terms of optimality of effective 
design for deterrence.61 
It also would be a miscalculation to narrowly look at public cost shifting 
when thinking about the betrayal of this partnership.  There are, of course, a 
litany of direct and indirect costs.62  There are also significant costs and 
externalities associated with the pretense of promoting good corporate 
citizenship that encumber stakeholders inside and outside of the partnership.  
More important, a full accounting recognizes that the costs of this milestone 
extend beyond a simple function of public versus private sector spending. 
C. The Costs of Chasing the Tail of Good Corporate Citizenship 
How corporate self-regulation matured or failed to mature over time 
reveals a number of costs and externalities that should be considered in any 
model of this failed partnership, e.g., a wide range of public losses that are a 
direct or indirect function of this failure beyond the price paid to meet or 
exceed the requirements of the regulation itself, and the opportunity costs of 
employing personnel who, if deployed elsewhere in the organization would 
be adding business value.  These externalities include: (a) regulatory 
atrophy, i.e., where the kind, capacity, and quality of government 
 
 60.  See Laufer, supra note 49 (discussing the horse-trading, or shrewd bargaining, in 
cooperative compliance relationships). 
 61.  See Sally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie, Mariel Alper, Natalie Schell-Busey, William 
S. Laufer, & N. Craig Smith, Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic Review, CAMPBELL 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (May, 2014) (showing, empirically, the deterrent effects of law, 
punitive damages, and regulatory policies). 
 62.  For a good taxonomy of 18 different direct and indirect costs of regulations affecting 
the government, citizens and businesses, and consumers and producers, see Wim Marneffe & 
Lode Vereeck, The Meaning of Regulatory Costs, 32 EUR. J. L. ECON. 341, 343 (2011) 
(identifying fifteen direct costs and two indirect costs in an analysis of types of regulatory 
costs); see also Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253 (2007) 
(presenting empirical evidence on the magnitude of direct regulatory costs within the financial 
services industry). 
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monitoring, surveillance, and investigatory services, now largely shifted to 
private firm counterparts, diminishes significantly; (b) firm opacity, i.e., 
where private sector compliance spending, often in the name of transparency 
and good citizenship, deftly obscures the identity of compliant and non-
compliant firms for regulators exploring possible wrongdoing; (c) 
reactionary discretion, i.e., where the failure of adequate government 
investment in regulatory capacity, along with regulatory atrophy, result in 
either prosecutorial declinations or symbolic prosecutions that may not be in 
the best interests of the public; (d) stakeholder deception, i.e., where the 
exercise of regulatory discretion promotes an enforcement facade that 
convinces stakeholders, including those in foreign jurisdictions, that our 
brand of enforced self-regulation works well and is fair and deserving of 
emulation; and (e) compromised priorities, where the costs of betraying 
partnership responsibilities result in the apportioning of criminal justice 
expenditures in ways that are inconsistent with stated priorities, and lay 
consensus of crime seriousness. 
It is this last externality that is most symbolic and telling.  What is the 
justification for such disproportionate public versus private investments in 
regulatory enforcement?  Specifically, why does the State assume the order 
maintenance costs for street crimes and expect the private sector to 
underwrite the lion’s share of equivalent firm costs, including underwriting 
the complex of due diligence requirements?  Is the shifting of costs fair 
because the private sector can best afford these expenditures?  If so, what 
residual or corresponding private sector policing responsibilities should be 
reserved for the State and, as important, who keeps tab on the reasonableness 
of these expenditures?  Finally, is there a limit to the State’s expectation for 
underwriting private sector policing and law enforcement? 
Answers to these questions will not come from research on lay 
perceptions of crime seriousness.  Study after study show a lay consensus 
that ranks corporate wrongdoing equally with serious common law 
offenses.63  Answers also will not come from the language of government 
 
 63.  See Cedric Michel, John K. Cochran, and Kathleen M. Heide, Public Knowledge 
About White-Collar Crime: An Exploratory Study, 65 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 67 (2016) 
(discussing the results of a study about lay knowledge perception about white-collar crime 
rather than public opinions revealing that the public bought into myths about the crimes 
committed by the powerful); Francis T. Cullen, B. G. Link, and C. W. Polanzi, The 
Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward White Collar Crime Changed? 20 
CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1982) (describing the results of a study where participants ranked vignettes 
describing a street crime scenario to be more serious than a white collar crime scenario); 
Nicole L. Piquero, S. Carmichael, and Alex R. Piquero, Assessing the Perceived Seriousness 
of White-Collar and Street Crimes. 54 CRIM. & DELINQ. 291 (2008) (discussing a study that 
found that certain white-collar crimes, like embezzlement, were perceived to be more serious 
when compared to certain street crimes, like handbag theft); S. P. Rosenmerkel, Wrongfulness 
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prosecutors and regulators who, like the words of their predecessors, still 
speak about corporate cases in the most zealous and overly righteous terms.  
Below, I argue that the difficulty in weighing the value to the State of waging 
a war on drugs, for example, relative to pursuing a campaign against 
corporate fraud comes from less-than-obvious lacunae. 
The pursuit of a war against drugs is popularly seen as targeting evils 
worthy of a public enforcement investment, e.g., drug-related crimes, gang 
violence, drug-related disease and overdose, and organized criminal 
organizations.64  The daily body count of drug-related violence is a dramatic 
and tragic fixture of inner city life around the United States, from Chicago 
and Detroit to Baltimore and Washington, D.C.65  The immorality of illicit 
drug use represents to the public a complex but all-too-familiar combination 
of addiction, disease, unemployment, lost productivity, and crime.  The 
moral coherence of these “costs” sustains a State-sponsored war that 
continues to this day, remarkably, even with equivocal evidence that waging 
 
and Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness of White Collar Offenses. 17 J. OF CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 308 (2001) (discussing a study that adds to the existing notion that breaks down 
the comparative seriousness perception of white collar and street crime to include notions of 
morality, harm, and wrongfulness). 
 64.  See Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in 
American Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425, 427 (1994) (discussing how the framing of the drug 
problem as a criminal problem justified aggressive law enforcement and criminal justice 
practices); William N. Elwood, RHETORIC IN THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE TRIUMPHS AND 
TRAGEDIES OF PUBLIC RELATIONS (Greenwood Publg. Group 1994) (discussing how public 
rhetoric branded drug users to the public and how this helped America’s drug problem but 
also negatively impacted minorities); Whitford & Yates, Policy Signals and Executive 
Governance: Presidential Rhetoric in the “War on Drugs,” 65 J. POL. 995 (2003) (discussing 
the impact of presidential rhetoric on bureaucratic enforcement behaviors and decisions). 
 65.  See Elizabeth Griffiths and Jorge M. Chavez, Communities, Street Guns and 
Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980–1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide 
Trends Across Space and Time, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 941,943 (2004) (portraying the 
concentration of deaths in urban settings and studying murder trends across Chicago’s 
neighborhoods); Emily Goldmann, Allison Aiello, Monica Uddin, Jorge Delva, Karestan 
Koenen, Larry M. Gant, and Sandro Galea, Pervasive Exposure to Violence and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a Predominantly African American Urban Community: The 
Detroit Neighborhood Health Study, 24 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 747 (2011) (discussing a study 
analyzing over a thousand African-Americans in Detroit with their symptoms of PTSD after 
witnessing traumatic street crimes); Aaron Curry, Carl Latkin, and Melissa Davey-Rothwell, 
Pathways to Depression: The Impact of Neighborhood Violent Crime on Inner-City Residents 
in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 23 (2008) (describing results of a study 
that assessed exposure to street crime as it relates to depressive symptoms among residents of 
Baltimore, Maryland); David M. Altschuler and Paul J. Brownstein, Patterns of Drug Use, 
Drug Trafficking, and Other Delinquency Among Inner-City Adolescent Males in 
Washington, D.C., 29 CRIMINOLOGY 589 (1991) (finding that while drugs made youths more 
likely to commit crimes, it is only a minority of crimes committed that are associated with 
drugs).  
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this war is a success.66  There is no equivalent moral coherence when 
corporate wrongdoing is unpacked.  Missing is a compelling portrait of the 
dramatic impact of corporate culpability and, in particular, a full account that 
connects wrongful corporate behavior with actual victims.  Missing is both 
disgust and revulsion for corporate wrongdoing, emotions that make the 
criminal law so very unique.67  It sounds trite, but there is no corporate 
victimology that reflects and elicits moral indignation like that of street 
crimes. 
D. Moral Indignation and a Missing Corporate Victimology 
Prosecutors and regulators are often long on moral rhetoric about 
corporate wrongdoing and short on authentic anger and moral indignation.  
The cries of indignation from left-of-center civil society activists give way 
to the needs of firms, markets, risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and capitalism.  
The problem, we are told, is actually one of over-criminalization, 
metaphysical games with attributions of personhood, and confounding 
conceptions of culpability.68  It seems as if it is simply impossible to muster 
the kind of moral disapproval necessary to support a sustained campaign 
against fraud on Wall Street.  It is, after all, a tall order to even try to wrestle 
the main engines of economic growth to the ground. 
There is no comparable shortage of indignation, outrage, fear, and anger 
over street crime.69  The politics of conventional crime are moved by a near 
 
 66.  John J. Donohue III, Benjamin Ewing, and David Peloquin, Rethinking America’s 
Illegal Drug Policy, in Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Justin McCrary, CONTROLLING 
CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 215, 270 (2011) (concluding that marijuana and cocaine 
legalization and decriminalization can reduce overall social costs resulting from the drugs); 
Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The Continued 
Failure of the War on Drugs, POLICY ANALYSIS: CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 12, 2017). 
 67.  See Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269,356 (1996) (discussing disgust and stigma as critically 
important moral features of the criminal law); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: 
Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (2002) (arguing that highly publicized, 
but low probability dangers can lead to irrational legal and regulatory outcomes as a result of 
public overreaction). 
 68.  David Ronnegard and Manuel Velasquez, On (Not) Attributing Moral Responsibility 
to Organizations, in Eric W. Orts and N. Craig Smith (eds.), THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
FIRMS (2017) (assessing the liability that firms may have, as well as the people running them, 
in relation to their civil and criminal actions); Eric W. Orts, The Moral Responsibility of 
Firms: Past, Present, and Future in Eric W. Orts and N. Craig Smith (eds.), THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS (2017). 
 69.  Alyssa Davis, In U.S., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-Year High, GALLUP 
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190475/americans-concern-crime-climbs-year-
high.aspx [https://perma.cc/59YJ-WSZY]. 
Americans’ level of concern about crime and violence is at its highest point in 
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insatiable anger over violent crime, fear of drug-related violence, and craving 
for the incapacitation of “bad guys.”70  The images of hooded thugs, armed 
drug dealers, and natural born predators cannot compete with the conference-
room conspiracies of a board’s audit committee or the passive managerial 
winking of senior leadership.71  When one thinks about the evils of violent 
drug cartels and savage terrorist organizations, who is moved by the 
complicit, if not facilitating, role of one of the largest and most profitable 
banks in laundering some newfound wealth from cross-border transactions?  
When one thinks about deeply ingrained predispositions that equate 
blackness with badness throughout much of the criminal process, there is 
really nothing comparable in our thinking about corporate deception and 
complex organizational frauds.72  Our sense of being wronged by 
corporations and their senior agents is taken seriously but does not encourage 
 
15 years.  Fifty-three percent of U.S. adults say they personally worry “a great 
deal” about crime and violence, an increase of 14 percentage points since 2014.  
This figure is the highest Gallup has measured since March 2001.  Americans’ 
worry about drug use has followed the same basic pattern over the last 15 years 
as worry about crime and violence. Forty-four percent of U.S. adults say they 
worry a great deal about drug use, up 10 points from the low found in 2014. 
Id. 
 70.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 
405, 433 (2008) (discussing the effects that “unjustifiably intense indignation” can have on 
the decisions of legal and political institutions); William S. Laufer, Where is the Moral 
Indignation over Corporate Crime? in D. Brodowski, M. Esponoza de los Monteros de la 
Para, K. Tiedmann, and J. Vogel (eds.), REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2014). 
 71.  For a classic image of conformance to corporate life, see William H. Whyte, THE 
ORGANIZATION MAN (1956) (describing in narrative form the life of an ambiguous 
businessman from his/her early years, education, entering the firm, conforming to the norms 
of the firm, and then living his/her life in suburbia). 
 72.  Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of 
Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 384 (1997) (explaining that “whites who view 
African-Americans as violent (and lazy) are far more likely to believe them to be guilty of 
assault,” while white-collar crime does not have a similar effect on judgment because “whites 
do not envision the white-collar crime as a part of the underclass racial stereotype”); J. L. 
Eberhardt, P.G. Davies, V. J. Purdie-Vaughns, and S. L. Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: 
Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes. 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI 383 (2006) (explaining a study that found that blacks who commit crimes 
against whites are more likely to receive the death sentence if they look more stereotypically 
black, but if the victim was black, the rates for death sentences are not significantly higher for 
the stereotypically black-looking defendant).  For an outstanding review of the issues, see 
Randall Kennedy, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (analyzing the impact race has on 
different facets of the legal system such as the enforcement of laws, composition of juries, 
punishments, and the war on drugs).  For a classic set of scholarly readings, see Darnell F. 
Hawkins (ed.) ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME AND PLACE (1995) 
(discussing the rise of police aggressiveness in 1900 towards immigrants, violence towards 
African Americans by white lynch mobs, tribal versus federal jurisdiction on Indian lands, 
and other race-crime associations). 
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the kind of emotions necessary to support a fair and reasonable regime of 
corporate criminal justice.73 
A corporate victimology would likely reveal layers of victimization 
across a wide spectrum of stakeholders; reset our perception of corporate 
culpability in relation to possible sanctions; and correct the misperception 
that corporate wrongs are somehow less-than-serious wrongs against the 
State, wrongs against the community, and wrongs against us.74  Aligning the 
measure of corporate culpability in relation to both liability and punishment 
is the ultimate achievement.75  In the absence of corporate victimology, 
though, criminal justice expenditures go to where the outrage is, where the 
fear is, and where crime control wars actually earn some real political favor 
or patronage. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN CORPORATE CRIME SPENDING 
The State does not have a monopoly on the provision of criminal 
justice services.  Recognition must be given to the importance of private 
for-profit and non-profit agencies, programs, and interventions that make 
up a private criminal justice.76  Moreover, it is clear that civil, 
administrative, and regulatory actions approach, if not approximate, the 
corporate criminal law in many ways.77  It is, nevertheless, axiomatic that 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes and Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 
ANNU. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 161, 165-69 (2012) (demonstrating the ability of victim impact 
statements to undermine the fairness of the criminal justice process because of the emotions 
they evoke). 
 74.  For a review of the literature, see Dave Whyte, Victims of Corporate Crime, in 
Sandra Walklate (ed.) HANDBOOK OF VICTIMS AND VICTIMOLOGY 446 (2007) (analyzing 
corporate crime victimology through such factors like unequal relations of power, safety of 
food and other manufactured products, and neo-liberal social orders). 
 75.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 708-09 
(1994) (making connections between a constructive corporate fault and criminal liability). 
 76.  See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999) 
(analyzing the benefits of private policing in terms of economics, constitutional fairness, and 
the reduction of red tape); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2004) (discussing many benefits and paradoxes of private policing such 
as how the size of private police forces are over three times as large as the public police units). 
 77.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) (analyzing the 
overlapping of the criminal and civil law systems and how a framework of behavioral analysis 
and incentives can be better than a doctrinal one); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: 
Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line 
Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981) (advocating against the current 
norm of attaching federal punishments to breach of fiduciary duties and how they should not 
come into play until state and private action is proven ineffective); Daniel R. Fischel and Alan 
O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (advocating for the use of civil 
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the public policing function reflects the formality of the modern State as 
an instrument of social control and the fair exercise of government power.  
After all, it is the State that reserves the responsibility for conceiving of 
the role and order maintenance functions of both policing and crime 
control.78  For this reason and others, the allocation of criminal justice 
expenditures suggests the priority that the State gives to certain kinds of 
wrongdoing.79 
A. The State’s Ambivalence 
The abrogation of partnership responsibilities by regulators also 
says something about the relative value to the State of administering the 
corporate criminal law.  There remains a profound and longstanding 
ambivalence over command and control approaches to regulating 
corporations, given the inevitable costs to some of the most respected, if 
not cherished, of all for-profit institutions.  Concerns with the direct and 
collateral costs of corporate prosecution are so significant that, on the 
margins, they may engender a de facto deference to corporate power.  
The result of this regulatory deference is best seen in the disconnect 
between government representations about their vigilance with 
combatting corporate crime and the actual number of corporate criminal 
investigations, charges, trials, and convictions. With other government 
campaigns against drugs and guns, for example, rhetoric underplays the 
need for and marshalling of criminal justice resources. 
A different brand of ambivalence is found in reviews of the many 
costs of corporate wrongdoing to internal and external stakeholders.  It 
seems that conceiving of corporate wrongdoing as an offense or violation 
against the State remains a challenge.  The focus on harm to shareholders 
and other collateral “innocents” shifts attention away from thinking of 
corporate criminality as a violation of shared values, norms, and 
conventions.  Moreover, the centuries-old debate over the locus of 
wrongdoing in corporations — now whether liability comes from a 
 
remedies to punish corporate crime as criminal punishments are unnecessary). 
 78.  See Lucia Zedner, Policing Before and After the Police: The Historical Antecedents 
of Contemporary Crime Control, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 78,78 (2006) (“The institution of 
the police is synonymous with the modern state and public policing is one of the defining 
characteristics of state power.”). 
 79.  See, e.g., John Hagan, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY 
FROM THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN (2010); Nancy E. Marion and Willard 
M. Oliver, Congress, Crime, and Budgetary Responsiveness: A Study in Symbolic Politics, 20 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 115, 131 (2009) (describing how crime control policies are shaped in 
ways to secure political favor with the public and are largely symbolic as opposed to 
substantive). 
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responsible corporate officer or a collective intention — complicates and 
at times confounds the attribution of fault.80  Threshold questions remain 
about corporate moral agency and the appropriateness of corporations as 
objects of blame.81  This ambivalence leaves scant support for the kind of 
moral indignation from the State that is a condition precedent to the 
criminalization of corporate behavior. 
B. A Genuine Partner in Corporate Crime Control 
What would corporate regulation look like today if we had the benefit 
of two genuine partners aligned to combat wrongdoing from the start of the 
good corporate citizenship movement?  A creative and unconstrained 
historical revision of corporate crime control would place us in a very 
different regulatory world.  First, we would not have come close to this very 
special regulatory milestone if expenditures were not the solitary proxy for 
good corporate citizenship, if government functionaries had invested in the 
precepts of responsive-regulatory theory, gradations of increasingly formal 
regulatory capacity, and if both partners co-developed and deployed 
compliance systems and technology.  This means going beyond simple 
models to co-regulation to leverage technology in ways that permit “shared 
regulation.”  Second, a focus on evidence not expenditures would have led 
to significant reductions in costs.  No doubt having disclosure expectations 
recognize base rates of deviance also would have changed the trajectory of 
private sector costs.  Finally, making a meaningful effort to connect 
determinations of both culpability and liability to corporate punishment 
would have moved firms away from simply pricing out the costs of 
wrongdoing. 
One of the rarely discussed casualties of the missing public partner in 
corporate crime control is the absence of a functioning international public 
regulatory regime.  Large multinational corporations invest the most in 
building regulatory capacity, with some constructing sophisticated means of 
tracking each and every firm transaction across their entire global footprint.  
 
 80.  See Amy J. Sepinwall, Faultless Guilt: Toward a Relationship-Based Account of 
Criminal Liability, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 533-34 (2017) (demonstrating that while many 
might consider punishing a group member because of the misdeeds of another “primitive,” 
there are viable arguments that can support such punishment); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible 
Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 
2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371 (2014) (analyzing the need and justifications for the existing 
responsible corporate officer doctrine which can punish corporate officers who may not have 
been directly involved in the corporate crime). 
 81.  See, e.g., Orts & Smith, supra note 68 (assessing the liability that firms may have, as 
well as the people running them, in relation to their civil and criminal actions). 
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Governments around the world are dramatically outmatched by the 
sophisticated algorithms that drive compliance analyses of large data by 
these firms.  The failure of a comparable or even greater investment in public 
capacity across a wide range of jurisdictions directly contributes to 
regulatory inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and at times, unfairness.82 
III. A RETREAT FROM THIS MILESTONE: A COMPLIANCE 
CONVERGENCE 
There are some soon to be realized benefits of this largely one-sided 
investment in compliance.  After many years of unbridled spending, the 
ingredients are there for a disruption and then transformation in the private 
sector’s investment in compliance science.  These changes, I have argued 
elsewhere, come from an opportunistic convergence of corporate strategy, 
compliance science, compliance standards, and technology that will 
significantly reduce compliance-related expenditures while impacting firm 
culture, leadership, and people.83  For the first time, and as a sequelae of the 
partnership, there are testable GRC models, innovations in risk modeling, 
measures, metrics, data, analytics, standards, committed compliance 
professionals, relevant compliance scholarship, and large firm resources 
dedicated to promote good governance, organizational integrity, and 
compliance.84 
 
 82.  See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: 
Achievements and Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 73 (2010) (explaining that governments 
seem unable to regulate businesses’ activities due to the structure and scale of global 
production). 
 83.  See Laufer, supra note 7. 
 84.  See, e.g., Michael Volkov, THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2013); Tina Balke, Marina 
De Vos & Julian Padget, I-ABM: Combining Institutional Frameworks and Agent-Based 
Modelling for the Design of Enforcement Policies, 21 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 371, 372 
(2013) (introducing formal and empirical models, such as institutional frameworks and agent-
based models, to explore policy outcomes); Samson Esayas & Tobias Mahler, Modeling 
Compliance Risk: A Structured Approach, 23 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 271, 275 (2015) 
(suggesting a five-step process as a structured, systematic approach to a graphical modeling 
of compliance risks); Carole Switzer, Accelerating the Evolution of GRC, 13 COMPLIANCE 
WK., July 2016, at 70 (explaining that GRC systems can analyze vast amounts of data from 
systems like email, voice messages, and social media posts, and can provide reports to 
compliance professionals); The GRC Market is Expanding at an Exponential Rate, LOCKPATH 
(June 29, 2015), (available at: https://www.lockpath.com/blog/the-grc-market-is-expanding-
at-an-exponential-rate/ [https://perma.cc/E4D5-JACC]) (“With over 600 GRC solutions on 
the market currently, it seems that predictions show that the GRC market would hit $31.77 
billion by the year 2020 with global compliance market spend reaching $2.6 billion in 2015 
alone”); John Verver, Big Data and GRC, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (June 21, 2013); 
see also Anant Kale, Artificial Intelligence: The New Super Power for Compliance, 
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This joins enterprise-wide governance, risk, and compliance standards, 
from the Enterprise Risk Management Standards of the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (Treadway Commission) (COSO ERM), and the 
International Organization for Standardization (e.g., ISO 19600, ISO 31000, 
and ISO 38500).85  This convergence in compliance thinking, standards, 
analytics, and metrics reflects a new private sector convention in required 
technology and regulatory orientation. 
There is little doubt that this compliance convergence will at some point 
reduce private sector costs, while facilitating a retreat from this regulatory 
milestone.  The development and sharing of increasingly sophisticated and 
elaborate RegTech and FinTech models from the United States and across 
Europe and Australia, for example, suggest that this new global compliance 
convention is not far away.86  This convention, as hinted to earlier, will likely 
 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsi
ghts.com/artificial-intelligence-new-superpower-business-compliance/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HJY-Q2WH] (proposing that advances in artificial intelligence can 
improve compliance). 
 85.  See Robert R. Moeller, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ESTABLISHING 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE PROCESSES 1-2 (2d ed. 2011) (setting forth 
an internal control framework that has become the accepted standard across the world); 
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 19600 (2014), https://www.iso.org/stan
dard/62342.html [https://perma.cc/4C9S-3ZGP] (providing guidance for establishing a 
compliance system within an organization); International Organization for Standardization, 
ISO 31000 (2009), https://www.iso.org/standard/43170.html [https://perma.cc/DS4E-2HPZ] 
(providing guidelines on risk management); International Organization for Standardization, 
38500 (2008), https://www.iso.org/standard/51639.html [https://perma.cc/NY6H-JJRC] 
(providing guidance on corporate directors’ use of information technology). 
 86.  See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A 
Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 572  
(2016) (arguing for technology to be used to update regulation and enable regulators to keep 
up with evolving markets); Iris H. Chiu, FinTech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial 
Products, Intermediation and Markets: Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 55, 56 (2016) (discussing the potential disruption of technology to the 
traditional financial services industry); C. Andrew Gerlach, Rebecca Simmons & Stephen 
Lam, US Regulation of FinTech: Recent Developments and Challenges, J. FIN. 
TRANSFORMATION, Nov. 2016 at 87,95 (explaining an alternative approach that would allow 
FinTech companies to work together with regulators); Philip Treleaven, Financial Regulation 
of FinTech, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. at 14 (2015) (suggesting that the next challenge lies in encouraging 
regulators, financial institutions, FinTech companies, and others to come together to improve 
financial regulation); Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 22476 2016) (considering a different approach to regulation 
that would benefit from the FinTech movement); see also Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond 
Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial 
Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 195 (2016) (advocating the adoption of an endogenous theory 
of regulation that would consider the unique nature of technology); Cliff Moyce, How 
Blockchain Can Revolutionize Regulatory Compliance Technology, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
INSIGHTS (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/blockchain-
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turn on the advent of technology that allows for a sharing of data and systems 
between the regulated and regulators — and among regulators across 
jurisdictions.  As suggested earlier, the hope is that “sharing compliance” 
models will soon dot the regulatory landscape. 
IV. OF PENALTIES, IRONIES, AND EQUIVALENCIES 
One of the strongest arguments against corporate criminal liability turns 
on its overly burdensome collateral and direct costs.  The longstanding 
neoconservative view is that the costs of corporate criminal liability are far 
too great, that costs are difficult to contain and control, especially in ways 
that reasonably correspond to the wrongdoing, and that innocents within and 
outside the firm are snared and besmirched in ways that are unjustifiably 
costly.87  The focus is on unfairness to shareholders, consumers, and other 
innocents.  This conventional account, though, fails to reveal the more 
profound meanings of this milestone.  Three concluding thoughts attempt to 
shed some light on our investment in good corporate citizenship.  First, it is 
worthwhile to ask whether regulators and prosecutors justify their neglect 
because they have simply baked the estimated corporate culpability costs 
into the price of compliance expenditures.  If so, the purchase of compliance 
expenditures escalating to this milestone may be seen as a passive and 
preemptive compliance penalty.  The second thought considers some of the 
subtle and not so subtle ironies at the approach of this very special milestone.  
Finally, after further considering the meaning of private and public spending, 
it seems reasonable, perhaps overdue, to squarely address the questionable 
equivalence of street crime and suite crime. 
A. A Preemptive Compliance Penalty? 
An admittedly cynical explanation of this one-sided “partnership” is 
that when government functionaries failed to actively invest in their share of 
enforced self-regulation, they signaled regular increases in the price of firm 
due diligence in ways that accommodated their perceptions of the cost of 
regulatees’ base rates of undetected organizational deviance.  Knowing the 
difficulty of gaining access to inculpatory evidence — exacerbated by opting 
out of active investing and oversight — regulators and prosecutors captured 
 
regulatory-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/SMR9-TVZU] (explaining that blockchain 
technology has the ability to transform businesses processes). 
 87.  See John Hasnas, The Phantom Menace of the Responsibility Deficit, in THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 89, 102 (Eric W. Orts and N. Craig Smith eds., 2017) (arguing 
against corporate criminal liability because it imposes vicarious collective punishment, which 
is unjust).  
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up front their estimated value of penalties and sanctions that would have been 
realized if they had wholly invested in the partnership.  If this explains some 
variance in the regulatory equilibrium, then these expenditures may be 
thought of as a preemptive compliance penalty.   
Regulators and prosecutors are all too aware that they see only a very, 
very small fraction of all actionable cases.88  The vast majority of corporate 
wrongdoing allegations are not reported, not acted on by management, or 
handled internally at the firm.89  Base rates of wrongdoing by agents are 
remarkably robust, leaving a significant share of uninvestigated and un-
adjudicated wrongdoing.90 
While it is fair to assume that this dark figure of corporate culpability is 
increasing, the number of regulatory cases and corporate criminal cases have 
consistently declined.91  All of this brings about a healthy share of justice that 
is not done — undistributed justice.92  Increasing the price associated with 
good corporate citizenship directly addresses the undistributed justice 
problem.  Ramping up the costs of due diligence simply offsets the losses 
and perceived losses from the growing dark figure of corporate culpability, 
 
 88.  See, e.g., TracReports, supra note 38 (“Over the FY 2004 - 2014 period, Justice 
Department records show a total of more than 1.6 million defendants were criminally 
prosecuted. Fully 99.8 percent of these prosecutions were aimed at individuals; only two 
tenths of one percent (0.2%) — or one in 500 — involved companies.”). 
 89.  For domestic and international survey data revealing the referral rate, see ETHICS 
RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF FORTUNE 500 EMPLOYEES 13 
(2012) (“Unevenness of reporting poses an additional risk for businesses because it suggests 
a disconnect between employees’ values and those of the employer.”); ETHICS & COMPLIANCE 
INITIATIVE, GLOBAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 18 (2016) (comparing countries’ reporting 
rates of bribery and corruption-related misconduct).  
 90.  A wide range of surveys tend to show base rates of observed misconduct by 
employees (over the past 12 months) between forty and fifty percent.  For example, ECI/ERC 
data ranged from fifty-one percent in 2000 to forty-one percent in 2013.  See ETHICS 
RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES WORKFORCE 
20 (2014) (“Surveyed employees said that members of management are responsible for six of 
every ten instances of misconduct, and they pointed the finger at senior managers in 24 percent 
of observed rule-breaking.”). 
 91.  See TracReports, supra note 38 (concluding that the number of criminal corporate 
prosecutions by the US Department of Justice has declined by 29% between 2004 and 2014); 
TracReports, IRS Auditing of Big Corporations Plummets: Potential Annual Revenue Loss 
$15 Billion (March 15, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/latest/416/ [https://perma.cc/FE4A-
DR6D] (finding that the IRS has undertaken a significantly reduced number of audits). 
 92.  Undistributed justice, like a “justice remainder,” is borrowed from the hard 
retributive notion of justice left undone.  See William S. Laufer & Nien-he Hsieh, Choosing 
Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343, 346 (2003) (explaining that retributivism lies at the 
heart of unequal justice).  The term may be traced to the work of Bernard Williams.  See 
Bernard Williams, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 (1981) (discussing 
“moral remainder”); see also Sepinwall, supra note 80, at 570 (distinguishing between fault 
and blame and arguing that a blame standard would bring about more justice). 
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e.g., the “blameworthiness” associated with the difference between corporate 
crimes known to the government and base rates of corporate wrongdoing 
from self-reports and survey data.93 
Thinking of compliance expenditures as a preemptive penalty reveals 
some nuance to the motives of the players in the compliance game beyond 
the fact that it makes resort to formal adjudication of corporate criminal cases 
unnecessary to do justice.  From the firm’s perspective, the costs of 
compliance are paid as ever-increasing insurance premiums against liability.  
The idea of a preemptive penalty helps explain why concerns with the moral 
hazard problem here were largely ignored.  From the regulator’s line of sight, 
the complexity and near impenetrability of the corporate form would leave 
significant undistributed justice but for the collection of an upfront or 
preemptive compliance penalty. 
Conceiving of the compliance game in this way also puts into 
perspective calls for more individual prosecutions in the wake of the Yates 
Memorandum, frustrations of the public with symbolic and infrequent use of 
the corporate criminal law in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008, 
and very late evidence-empty criteria offered by the DOJ to evaluate the 
effectiveness of compliance.  Regulators know that there are no accepted 
evidence-based metrics for what constitutes an effective compliance 
program more than two decades into this experiment of good corporate 
citizenship.94 
Thinking of the game in this way also offers a good explanation for the 
ambivalence, more generally, concerning corporate criminal law.  Through 
a very simple process of elimination, it seems clear that no stakeholder is 
truly invested in or committed to the idea of entity liability.95  That regulators 
realized how to use the fear of this kind of criminalization to do justice, while 
maintaining the appearance of genuine ambivalence with corporate liability, 
is no small feat. 
 
 93.  See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, Regulation Versus Taxation, 110 
J. PUB. ECON. 147, 153 (2014) (examining when people favor a tax over regulation to curb 
activities that create negative externalities). 
 94.  See Parker & Nielsen, supra note 41, at 64 (seriously questioning whether evaluation 
science is up to the task of assessing compliance effectiveness); Danielle E. Warren, Joseph 
P. Gaspar, & William S. Laufer, Is Formal Ethics Training Merely Cosmetic? A Study of 
Ethics Training and Ethical Organizational Culture, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 85, 106-08 (2014) 
(working to identify which factors in an integrity initiative at a large bank contribute to 
changes in both behavior and culture). 
 95.  See generally Laufer supra note 6 (discussing the history of the good corporate 
citizenship movement).  
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B.  Irony and Fairness 
Abolitionists of corporate criminal liability have for years bemoaned 
the immense costs to innocents and significant externalities of criminal 
investigations, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions against 
corporations.96  They, and likeminded conservatives, however, missed taking 
a strong principled position against a regulatory strategy of compliance cost 
shifting to the private sector that brings us closer to this historic spending 
milestone.  All along, the threat of unfair and burdensome costs did not 
actually reside with the rare event of corporate criminal liability, a regular 
target of the private sector’s concerns.  Rather, the threat of unfair and 
burdensome costs came from firms taking the regulatory bait that compliance 
expenditures will insure against liability.  There is some irony here, perhaps 
situational irony, that regulators found a way to make the regulated fear the 
costs of criminal liability so much that, in the name of due diligence and 
corporate crime control, they pay an increasingly steep if not exorbitant 
preemptive penalty.97 
It is not the seductive nature of corporate spending, however, that is 
most deserving of any attribution of irony.  Consider, instead, that those at 
greatest risk to assume an unfair burden of corporate criminal costs — 
shareholders and other “innocents” — actually pay as much, if not more, 
with the historic rise of defensive compliance expenditures.  It is quite 
difficult to square this ex ante burden on innocents with any expressed 
concerns that criminal liability should be avoided if it entails unjust collateral 
consequences or the notion that prosecutors must mind collateral damage 
when considering a corporate prosecution. 
Perhaps the ultimate irony is that while corporate wrongdoing does not 
seem to engender a moral indignation comparable to that of street crime 
when it comes to culpability, the very idea of a preemptive compliance 
penalty for corporations encourages a normative discussion of substantive 
fairness that is quite familiar; for example, considering the fairness of 
aggressive stop and frisk policing strategies on inner city streets, bail 
 
 96.  See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009) (advocating for the abolition 
of corporate criminal liability); John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 197 (2004-2005) (explaining 
how costs prevent the enforcement of corporate criminal statutes).  
 97.  See James R. Chelius and Robert S. Smith, Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance 
Costs: The Case of Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 6 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 193, 
201 (1987) (describing the effects of high insurance premiums and compliance costs that 
follow regulations, especially regarding small firms); Millar, supra note 44 (discussing the 
increased fees associated with compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
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decisions that promote the preventive detention of indigent defendants, and 
policies that allow for the selective incapacitation of high risk delinquents.98  
There is a comparable anticipatory feature or dimension in corporate 
regulation that entices some ethicists and philosophers to question “whether 
in the advance of any harm to any individual, there is any basis in morality 
for forcing compliance.”99 
That this penalty goes to the perceived base rate of wrongdoing, not a 
speculative assessment of potential or possible wrongdoing, distinguishes 
and diminishes this fairness concern.  This preemptive penalty is not in 
anticipation of any wrong committed.  That said, even if there is an obvious 
moral basis for “forcing compliance,” it becomes a little less obvious as 
compliance expenditures continue to rise unabated.  The time will come 
when the constraint from compliance-related social controls will make the 
workplace completely inhospitable.100  At some point, even those most 
progressive or libertarian will conclude that compliance expenditures are far 
beyond optimal levels to satisfy a deterrence rationale, or so significantly 
disproportionate as to violate desert-based principles.101 
C. Costs and the Equivalency of Streets and Suites 
The choice of promoting criminal versus corporate criminal justice 
reflects a profound normative and ideological divide.  Critical fault lines 
differentiate the philosophies that justify the imposition of the criminal law; 
 
 98.  See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, Selective Incapacitation and the Effort to 
Improve the Fairness of Existing Sentencing Practices, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
53 (1983) (justifying a policy of selective incapacitation); Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan, 
and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” 
Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. OF THE AM. STAT. ASS’N. 813 (2007) 
(comparing pedestrian stop rates for racial demographics in NYC); Douglas Husak, Lifting 
the Cloak: Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1173 (2011) 
(advocating for preventative detention if it can be structured as state criminal law 
punishment). 
 99.  Edward Soule, MORALITY AND MARKETS: THE ETHICS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
83 (2003); see generally Tibor Machan, The Petty Tyranny of Government Regulation, in 
RIGHTS AND REGULATION 259 (T. Machan & M. Bruce Johnson eds., 1983) (proposing the 
idea that government regulation is morally impermissible and undermines humans’ autonomy 
and rights).  
 100.  See William S. Laufer & Diana C. Robertson, Corporate Ethics Initiatives as Social 
Control, 16 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 1029 (1997) (discussing social controls and raising concerns 
about over controlled, overly compliant work environments). 
 101.  See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and 
Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285 (2000) (arguing for the importance 
of a desert-based account for corporate criminal liability); see also Laufer, supra note 29 
(examining optimal compliance expenditures and the consequence that going beyond them 
undermines deterrent value). 
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theories that explain the criminal law’s role in regulating behavior; and 
answers to some of the most vexing metaphysical questions about culpability 
and liability.  Challenges to the legitimacy of both laws and law enforcement 
are radically different in the street versus suite context.  So, too, are the range 
of regulatory strategies, remedies, and sanctions.  Still, the discrepancy is 
notable and puzzling.102 
The approaching milestone of both compliance costs and employment, 
however, encourages some subtle comparisons and distinctions.  For 
example, the idea that corporate criminal justice may be accomplished, at 
least in part, with an enforced self-regulatory slight-of-hand has no 
equivalent in conventional criminal justice.  There are many other 
preemptive efforts at “justice” in the criminal process that raise serious 
concerns about the timing, calculation, burden, effectiveness, and fairness of 
this kind of anticipatory penalty.103  These interventions, though, are not 
executed with a slight-of-hand so that the direct and indirect costs are hidden.  
In the criminal process, the disparate impact of race, ethnicity, and class is 
so transparent, obvious, well-documented, and longstanding that one might 
think there is a very generous accommodation to both inequality and 
injustice.  In fact, for some, the open and notorious accommodation to the 
many costs of inequality defines an entire domain of formal social control, 
with practices that will likely be tolerated or ignored for another generation 
or more.104 
There is accommodation to the costs of corporate criminal justice, as 
seen in the acceptance of an equilibrium in the compliance game.  But this is 
a game of imagery, posturing, teases, threats, and faux indignation with 
multiple stakeholders that is largely privately-funded.  It is a game played by 
the most powerful “persons” in the world, against the most elite and capable 
 
 102.  See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of 
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001) (comparing and contrasting criminal 
liability for street and corporate crime). 
 103.  See Freda Adler, Gerhard O. W. Mueller, & William S. Laufer, CRIMINOLOGY (9th 
ed. 2017) (reviewing different interventions across the criminal process). 
 104.  See Marc Mauer, The Fragility of Criminal Justice Reform, 21 SOC. JUST. 14 (1994) 
(examining the decline of criminal justice reform and proposing strategies for future reform).  
Consider the intransigence of mass incarceration policies and practices.  See, e.g., Michelle 
Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2012) (arguing that mass incarceration of African-Americans is evidence that we continue to 
live in a world where the color of one’s skin can be outcome-determinative); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2003) (criticizing mass incarceration for its great racial inequalities 
by unevenly incarcerating African Americans); Bruce Western and Christopher Wildeman, 
The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND 
SOC. SCI. 221 (2009) (describing the growth of the American penal system focusing on racial 
inequality, its significance, and its social impact on African American families). 
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of law enforcement.  The costs imposed by this game are often set in reserve 
and, in the past, not fully paid.105  Here, corporations fall from grace for a 
quarter or, at worst, a fiscal year.106  And it is not a game for novices, it is not 
populated by novices, and all players agree to the opaque rules.  From the 
moral rhetoric used to suggest indignation with corporate deviance to the 
exemption and diversion of the largest of all firms from the criminal process, 
the most profound normative concerns with the costs of corporate criminal 
justice are simply subsumed by the game.  No one would ever say the same 
about our criminal justice system. 
The symbolism of this milestone is compelling.  How many private and 
public cops are really necessary for street and suite regulation, and who 
should pay?107  What does the public allocation of resources for criminal 
justice tell us about what and who matters most?  Foundational questions 
about policing the most powerful and powerless follow.  And, finally, this 
milestone allows for some reflection on how we justify imposing the most 
formal of social controls, at times final and irreversible, in the absence of 
evidence-based research.108 
 
 105.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-338, CRIMINAL DEBT: 
ACTIONS STILL NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE’S COLLECTION PROCESSES 
(2004) (discussing an increase in outstanding criminal debt and noting a need to improve the 
debt collection process); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: 
COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME 
VICTIMS IN SELECTED FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES (2005) (studying five selected debt cases and 
concluding that only about 7% of the court ordered restitution was actually collected); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-297, FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIMES AND SANCTIONS REQUIREMENTS (2016) (finding that from 
2009-2015, 12 billion dollars in fines were assessed and all but 100 million was collected by 
federal agencies). 
 106.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms 
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J. OF L. & ECON. 757 (1993) (analyzing fiscal data 
over time and proposing that additional criminal penalties are not necessary because 
reputational costs of corporate fraud are very high). Cf. Jason R. Pierce, Reexamining the Cost 
of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 20 J. OF MGMT 1 (2015) (finding that criminal 
prosecutions are correlated with a decline in stock value).  But cf. Jonathan M. Karpoff, John 
R. Lott, Jr, & Eric W. Wehrly, The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: 
Empirical Evidence, 48 J. OF L. & ECON. 653 (2005) (examining consequences of 
environmental violations on firms and determining that environmental violations are 
disciplined through legal and regulatory penalties rather than reputational). 
 107.  See generally Greg A. Caldeira & Andrew T. Cowart, Budgets, Institutions, and 
Change: Criminal Justice Policy in America, 24 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 413 (1980) (discussing 
the history of budgetary appropriations for criminal justice). 
 108.  See Simpson, supra note 61 (reviewing studies of formal legal and administrative 
control and prevention strategies for corporate criminal activity and determining that more 
methodologically rigorous studies are necessary since existing studies are limited, 
inconsistent, and contradictory). 
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CONCLUSION 
It is a fair assumption that the regulatory status quo will change with 
the increasing convergence of global standards with new governance, risk, 
and compliance methods, technologies, and shared enterprise-wide systems.  
There is little doubt that this convergence will bring about significant 
efficiencies and, at the same time, a discernable move away from this very 
special regulatory milestone.  This convergence opens a window for 
regulators and prosecutors to welcome a new phase of the decades-old good 
corporate citizenship movement, one that takes seriously their mandate as 
partners in corporate crime control. 
With both private and public partners, the prospects are good that a 
collaboration on compliance standards, methods, technologies, and science 
will address the challenges of undistributed corporate criminal justice with 
transparency and fairness.  One day soon, with a successful transition to a 
more responsive sharing of compliance data and systems across public and 
private stakeholders, there will be regret by many that we reached this 
remarkable milestone. 
Ideal models to inspire this kind of shared compliance are widely 
available, from Braithwaite’s notion of Regulatory Capitalism to Baldwin 
and Blacks’ Really Responsive Regulation.109  Here, we can all imagine a 
move away from the strictures of command and control regulation to a 
restructuring of what is public and private, a regulatory reordering that “is 
accompanied by an increase in delegation, proliferation of new technologies 
of regulation, formalization of inter-institutional and intra-institutional 
relations, and the proliferation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the 
shadow of the state.”110 
 
 109.  See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR 
MAKING IT WORK BETTER (2008) (presenting a model of regulatory capitalism and ideas for 
reform such as responsive regulation); see also David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of 
Regulatory Capitalism, 598 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLIT. AND SOC. SCI. 12 
(2005) (analyzing regulatory capitalism and suggesting that the change in the capitalist 
economy is understood by privatization, delegation, increased regulation technology, 
formalized regulation, and increased influence of international experts); J. Black, Decentering 
Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Postregulatory” 
World, 54 CURR. LEGAL PROBL. 103 (2001) (discussing how an understanding of decentering 
is necessary for future attempts at regulation); Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really 
Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L. REV. 59, 61 (2008) (proposing that “[w]e argue that to be 
really responsive regulators have to be responsive not only to the compliance performance of 
the regulatee, but in five further ways: to the firms’ own operating and cognitive frameworks 
(their ‘attitudinal settings’); to the broader institutional environment of the regulatory regime; 
to the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; to the regime’s own performance; and 
finally to changes in each of these elements.”). 
 110.  Levi-Faur, supra 109, at 13. 
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What happens, though, if this growing convergence fails to change the 
terms of this partnership?  What happens if the regulatory status quo is 
simply too resilient or the compliance game is too attractive to exit?  As 
compliance life in firms becomes more efficient and technology-bound, 
regulators and prosecutors will be left in increasing darkness.111  At the same 
time, there will be a rapidly-decreasing pool of corporate compliance 
expenditures to preemptively draw from.  With diminishing penalties being 
paid and stable base rates of wrongdoing, this means more undistributed 
corporate criminal justice.  One can only hope that this motivates both 
partners to finally join together in pursuing corporate crime control. 
 
 
 111.  See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in C. Coglianese (ed.) REGULATORY 
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 87 (2012) (discussing how 
darkness, the unknown, encourages error prone, backward looking regulations that often lag 
behind private actors); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment 
of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25 (2014) (discussing the 
problem of regulating in the dark without sufficient information, and proposing the inclusion 
of mechanisms for expert data collection and policy reassessment after a period of time). 
